University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 10

May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM

Commentary on: Andrew Aberdein's "Fallacy and argumentational
vice"
Maurice A. Finocchiaro
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Department of Philosophy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Finocchiaro, Maurice A., "Commentary on: Andrew Aberdein's "Fallacy and argumentational vice"" (2013).
OSSA Conference Archive. 4.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/4

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Commentary on: Andrew
argumentational vice”

Aberdein’s

“Fallacy

and

MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO
Department of Philosophy
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Las Vegas, Nevada 89154-5028
USA
maurice.finocchiaro@unlv.edu

1. The main strand of Aberdein’s paper, though perhaps not the only one, is an
argument in favor of the viability of a virtue-based theory of fallacies. This theory
claims chiefly that arguments can and should be appraised as fallacious, namely as
committing some fallacy, if and insofar as arguers have a disposition to engage in
various cognitive vices, namely a disposition to violate or fail to practice various
cognitive virtues. Aberdein’s argument amounts to defending this claim from a key
objection and supporting it with at least two reasons.
The key objection stems from a common view about ad hominem arguments;
that is, the view that it is illegitimate to criticize an argument on the basis of the
circumstances or character of the arguer; indeed to do so is, allegedly, to commit the
so-called ad hominem fallacy. Thus, or so the criticism goes, the virtue theory of
fallacies is itself advocating committing the ad hominem fallacy in the appraisal of
argumentation.
One of Aberdein’s supporting reasons is relatively specific and concrete; it
involves an analysis of several examples designed to show that it is sometimes
legitimate and proper to criticize arguments based on the cognitive circumstances
or intellectual character of arguers. His more general and programmatic reason is a
sketch of how the eighteen alleged fallacies which John Woods (2004, pp. 4-5; 2013,
chapter 1.2) has labeled the “gang of eighteen” could be analyzed as, or at least
correlated with, various cognitive vices, i.e., as violations or failures of cognitive
virtues.
Part of what I want to do in this commentary is to construe Aberdein’s paper
as an argument. This is an interpretive task which I have just fulfilled with the
reconstruction I have just sketched. Of course, in so doing I have made more explicit
what is already implicit in his essay. But I am also implicitly pursuing my own
agenda in logical theory, which is partly to emphasize, more than is usually done,
interpretive issues, as distinct from evaluative ones (cf. Finocchiaro, 2005, pp. 1415). Another part is to stress interpretation also at the meta-level, namely when the
argumentation in question is about arguments, which may be labeled metaargumentation (cf. Finocchiaro, 2013b). This is obviously the case in the present
context, where Aberdein’s argument is clearly a meta-argument. From this point of
view, the reconstructed summary I have just given is merely the tip of an analytical
iceberg, which is full of interesting complexities, and whose careful examination
could easily take up the rest of this session.
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-6.
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However, I also would like to appraise or evaluate Aberdein’s argument.
Ideally, this should be done not only on the basis of various principles which I find
plausible or are generally acceptable (“external” evaluation, so to speak), but also on
the basis of the various vices and virtues elaborated in his own account (“internal”
evaluation, so to speak). Moreover, it would also be desirable to conduct both the
external and the internal evaluations from a positive as well as negative point of
view, or at least to keep open the possibility that the commentator may end up
strengthening the object argument, and not necessarily refuting or weakening it.
Such a balanced evaluation would be especially important, given that the myriad
virtues and vices in Aberdein’s typology would tend to encourage an internal
evaluation that might easily turn into a nit-picking exercise.1
2. Let us begin our evaluation by focusing on the key objection to the virtue theory
of argument, charging that it commits the ad hominem fallacy. Some of what
Aberdein says in its defense makes it sound as if he were countercharging that, in so
charging, the critics are committing a fallacy of equivocation. This is the impression
conveyed by remarks such as the following: “In Section 2, I will show that this
criticism of virtue argumentation unsuccessfully trades on an ambiguity in the
definition of ad hominem” (sect. 1); and “once the ambiguity in the presentation of
the ad hominem is resolved, the theory is able to withstand the argument that it is
inherently fallacious” (sect. 6). I don’t think that such countercharge is accurate or
fair, but I mention this possibility because if the counterchange were correct, it
For example, consider Aberdein’s definition of ad hominem0 as “arguing from the respondent’s
commitments” (sect. 2). Now, Aberdein does admit that his list of five subtypes of ad hominem
arguments is “neither exhaustive nor exclusive” (sect. 2), and that “ad hominem0 is never
argumentationally vicious as such” (sect. 4); still, one could point out that his definition of ad
hominem0 is incomplete and misses the main part. In fact, it should be expanded to read “arguing
from the respondent’s commitments to derive a conclusion not acceptable or nor previously
accepted by him/her,” for this is the main point in this type of argumentation (cf. Johnstone, 1959;
Finocchiaro, 1974, 2001). Then one could search in Aberdein’s Table 2 (sect. 1) to find some virtue(s)
which he might be violating with this definition; possible candidates might be “insight into theories”
(2aiii), “sensitivity to detail” (2di), or “care” (4cii). Next, one would examine Aberdein’s Table 3 (sect.
5) to try to correlate such violation(s) with one or more fallacies. Similar issues would arise if we
consider Aberdein’s treatment of “composition and division” as if it were a single fallacy beset by
“inattention to detail, (2) (d) (i)” (sect. 5); however, composition and division refer to two argument
types that are basically the reverse of one another, and so the question would arise whether his
treatment embodies this very vice; and since here Aberdein may be adapting the gang-of-eighteen
list from others, there might also arise the question of what he (sect. 1) calls “fairness in evaluating
the arguments of others” (2bii) and “open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence” (2biii).
Finally, consider Aberdein’s remark that “although the fallacies are stigmatized in textbooks as
invariably bad, they are better understood as sometimes legitimate and sometimes not” (sect. 5);
taken literally, this claim is self-contradictory, since it says in part that fallacies are sometimes
legitimate, i.e., that illegitimate arguments are sometimes legitimate; thus, there certainly ought to be
some virtue which is being violated and some vice which is being exemplified, although it is hard to
find it in Aberdein’s Table 2; however, it is obvious that what he really means is that “although the
alleged fallacies are stigmatized …,” or to express it in a more round-about manner, “although the
argument types which textbooks call fallacies are stigmatized as invariably bad, those arguments are
better understood as sometimes legitimate and sometimes not”; and so formulated, this claim is both
right and important.
1
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would exemplify a beautiful sequence of argument, counterargument, and metaargument. That is, from an interpretive point of view, here we would have a very
interesting, and almost awe-inspiring, phenomenon.
However, Aberdein seems to be correct that the critics fail to distinguish and
interrelate sufficiently clearly and explicitly the various conceptions of ad hominem.
He himself discusses five different meanings, the principal ones of which are the
following: “ad hominem3: arguing that the respondent’s character rebuts his
argument; ad hominem4: arguing that the respondent’s character undercuts his
argument” (sect. 2). Here, Aberdein is adapting the terminology of John Pollock
(1992), for whom to “rebut” an argument apparently means to refute its conclusion
or prove a contrary claim, and to “undercut” an argument apparently means to show
that the presupposed link between premise and conclusion does not hold, i.e., that
the premise (whether true or false) does not really provide support for the
conclusion.
There is another strand in Aberdein’s reply to the ad hominem charge. He
points out that such critics claim that whereas ad hominem3 can be legitimate, ad
hominem4 never is, and in the process they assume uncritically that “it is commonly
supposed that it is never reasonable to reject an argument on the basis of such facts”
about the arguer (quoted in sect. 2, from Bowell & Kingsbury, 2013, p. 26). However,
Aberdein reports the views of several scholars, showing not only that there is
general agreement that ad hominem3 is sometimes correct, but also that “contrary
to [the critics], it is not ‘commonly supposed’ that ad hominem4 arguments are
always fallacious” (sect. 2).
The most interesting and important of these views is that of John Woods,
who not only distinguishes between ad hominem3 and ad hominem4, but also
interrelates them by grounding ad hominem3 on ad hominem4. Woods’s account is
quoted by Aberdein and is worth repeating: “(1) Sarah makes her ad hominem
retort. (2) She concludes from this that the adequacy of her opponent’s case is called
into doubt. (3) She concludes from this that there is reason to think that her
interlocutor’s position is false” (quoted sect. 2, from Woods, 2007, p. 124). Here,
Aberdein’s interpretation of this plausibly construes Woods’s term “case” as
“argument,” and his term “position” as “conclusion.”
3. Aberdein also replies to the ad hominem criticism by trying to show that the
critics’ key claim is false, namely that it is false that hominem4 arguments are always
fallacious; or positively expressed, that ad hominem4 arguments are sometimes
legitimate. This positive claim can also be viewed as a reason constructively
supporting the virtue theory. Aberdein discusses several examples to support this
claim.
Two of his examples involve simple arguments whose deductive validity or
invalidity depends in an obvious manner on the meaning of the premises; these
meanings depend in turn on various circumstances in which the arguers find
themselves, in such a way that the meaning of some key term is ambiguous and
shifts in the course of the argument, thus generating fallacies of equivocation. These
are presumably cases where even the deductive evaluation of an argument properly
depends on the circumstances of the arguer.
3
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Another group of cases involves heuristic nondeductive reasoning by
mathematicians, in which they reach conclusions about the likelihood that the proof
of a new mathematical result is correct. Sometimes they base their tentative
conclusion on the behavior of the mathematician involved, considering such things
as whether he fails to build upon previous work, and whether he wastes much space
on standard material (sect. 3).
And a third example briefly mentioned by Aberdein involves arguments by
proponents of intelligent design. Many such arguments can be accurately
interpreted as inferences to the best explanation, in which complex features of the
natural world are claimed to be inexplicable on evolutionary grounds but explicable
by intelligent design. However, as Aberdein plausibly points out, many such
arguments can also be fairly criticized insofar as their proponents tend to “ignore
relevant work showing how complex features of organisms can be the product of
natural selection; [and] dogmatically insist on their own preferred explanation”
(sect. 3).
As long as we do not exaggerate the import of the conclusion here, I believe
this is a cogent argument rendering it plausible that arguments can sometimes be
criticized on the basis of the intellectual character of the arguer, in the sense that the
link between premise and conclusion can be regarded as weakened by the presence
of various vices. In fact, here I would like to strengthen Aberdein’s claim by briefly
discussing a classic historical example.
4. The example comes from an argument which Galileo advanced on more than one
occasion in the context of the Copernican controversy in the seventeenth century.
He liked to point out all Copernicans had previously been Ptolemaics, but no
Ptolemaics had previously been Copernicans; moreover, the Copernicans knew the
pro-Ptolemaic arguments, but the Ptolemaics did not know the pro-Copernican
arguments. That is, the Copernicans were open-minded but the Ptolemaics were not,
or at least the Copernicans were more open-minded than the Ptolemaics. And from
this difference Galileo explicitly drew the conclusion that the Copernican arguments
were better than the Ptolemaic ones, and hence that Copernicanism was more likely
to be true than geocentrism (Galilei, 2008, pp. 148-52, 217-18; cf. Galilei, 1997, p.
149 n. 74; Finocchiaro, 2005, pp. 98-100).
Note the cautious and judicious formulation of Galileo’s meta-conclusion. He
is not claiming that the Ptolemaic arguments are worthless because their
proponents are closed-minded, nor that the Copernican arguments are conclusive
because the Copernican arguers are open-minded. Instead he is saying that the
closed-mindedness of the Ptolemaics is a clue to the weakness of their arguments,
and that the open-mindedness of the Copernicans is a clue to the strength of their
arguments. Moreover, Galileo does not pretend that this is the end of the story.
Rather he realizes that this is just one argument among many; that the particular
Ptolemaic arguments have to be concretely criticized on their own merits; and that
the particular Copernican arguments have to be also elaborated and defended in a
concrete manner.
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5. Finally, we come to what I called earlier Aberdeen’s general and programmatic
argument for a virtue theory of fallacies, consisting of a sketch of the connection
between Woods’s gang of eighteen and various cognitive vices. And here my attitude
is more critical, but unfortunately time and space limitation will force me to be even
more sketchy in my criticism than Aberdein is in his exposition.
So far I have agreed that Aberdein cogently defends his account from the
objection that it commits the ad hominem fallacy (although his defense does not
possess the elegance it would possess if it amounted to the countercharge that the
objection commits the fallacy of equivocation). And I have also agreed that his
inductive generalization for the propriety of ad hominem4 is cogent and
independently confirmable to some extent (although only to the extent of claiming
that such ad hominem4 undercutting merely weakens, but does not completely
destroy, the inferential correctness of the criticized argument). However, with
regard to the prospects for a general virtue-based theory of fallacies, I see some
serious obstacles.
The essential difficulty stems from the concept of fallacy. By fallacy is meant
a common type of argument that appears to be correct but in fact is not (cf. Whately,
1826, p. 131; Hamblin, 1970, pp. 224-25, 253-54; Finocchiaro, 1981, pp. 110-16;
Woods, 2012, p. 514; Woods, 2013, chapter 4.6; Finocchiaro, 2013a, sect. 1). There
are five elements in this conception: the fallacy must be (1) an argument, not a mere
claim; (2) the argument must belong to some more or less identifiable kind or type;
(3) the type must be common, in the sense of having frequently occurring instances;
(4) the argument must have the appearance of being correct; but (5) it must be
inferentially incorrect. Thus, to show that a given argument is a fallacy (“fallacious”
in the sense of committing some fallacy), it is clearly not enough to show that it is
inferentially incorrect, since there are three other conditions that must be fulfilled,
namely generality of kind, frequency of occurrence, and apparent correctness.
However, the account of fallacies adumbrated by Aberdein deals with only two of
these things, argumentation and inferential incorrectness. This is at best a theory of
argument appraisal, not a theory of fallacies.
And there is a second limitation, I believe. The negative appraisal of the
argument generated by the cognitive vices of the arguer is a relatively weak kind of
criticism; usually, one would want to supplement it with other more robust, more
internal, and more concrete kinds of criticism addressing the details of the content
and structure of the propositions involved. It is certainly important to understand
that criticism of the argument based on the cognitive vices of the arguer is not
irrelevant, but can be informative and effective to some extent; and as I said before,
Aberdein may be said to have shown that much. However, such ad hominem4
criticism is no substitute for the more traditional, non-agent-based kinds of
criticism.
6. However, to end on a more positive note, I would say that it is also important to
realize that, besides the traditional non-agent-based criticism of arguments, there
exists another kind which is based on good or bad dispositions of the arguers. In
fact, such ad hominem3 or ad hominem4 criticism corresponds to (although it is not
identical with) what many call methodological criticism, namely criticism based on
5
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methodological principles and practices. I am referring to such critiques as Albert
Einstein’s criticism of any physical theory that postulates a privileged inertial
system (Einstein, 1953; cf. Finocchiaro, 1980, pp. 67-68, 97), Karl Popper’s criticism
of Marxist social science (Popper, 1963; cf. Finocchiaro, 1979), Stephen Toulmin’s
criticism of formal deductive logic (Toulmin, 1958; cf. Finocchiaro, 2013b, pp. 7-17),
and, to come to less sublime and more pedestrian cases, my own criticism of the
standard treatment of fallacy theory (Finocchiaro, 1981; 1987).
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